i am prepared to die


英文版

I am the First Accused.

I hold a Bachelor’s Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said.

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case.

Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.

I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.

In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.

I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organization, and which have been charged in the indictment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organization.

I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.

But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, and not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years – that is until 1949 – it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the words of my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952, and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

“Who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all."

Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and non-violence had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word ‘Amadelakufa’ was first used: this was the time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. They were, and are, dedicated workers who are prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.

During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the ANC adhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgement some five years later, it found that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a communist organization.

In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the Government,’ and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self-respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say.

In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest.

The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The Government’s answer was to introduce new and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkhonto.

Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963.

I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how?

We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence – of the day when they would fight the White man and win back their country – and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial State by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.

It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out – it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government – though this is what prompted it – but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness.

At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said:

“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices – submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom."

This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.

We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations, including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized as follows:

* It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence.
* Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization.
* On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be subject to disciplinary action by the ANC.

I say ‘properly controlled violence’ because I made it clear that if I formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.

As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?

The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one which recognized civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable.

Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD):

“We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war."

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

Attacks on the economic life-lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government.

This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of ‘Mr. X’ and ‘Mr. Z.’

The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an importation from the Jewish national underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948.

Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations.

The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by suggesting the laager.

In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained.

But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines were being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so, how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release were killed by the police and white civilians. In 1921 more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1 May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike. On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.

How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could black and white ever live together again in peace and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions.

Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favorable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare.

All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.

At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a State.

It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and even in London I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.

I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject – from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views.

I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original decision of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South Africa.

I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document which is Exhibit R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened, the training would be of value.

I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto.

One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why this is incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the original principle laid down by the ANC. There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internally as well, because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by bannings and house arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led to individuals having to do work in different capacities. But though this may have blurred the distinction between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction. Great care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations in South Africa distinct. The ANC remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto remained a small organization recruiting its members from different races and organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that members of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons served both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change the nature of the ANC or give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than the rule. This is why persons such as ‘Mr. X’ and ‘Mr. Z,’ who were on the Regional Command of their respective areas, did not participate in any of the ANC committees or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their ANC meetings.

Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and knew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place.

I came there in the following manner:

* As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country, living now in African townships, then in country villages and again in cities.
* During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.
* In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could live differently and work far more efficiently.
* For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on 5 August.
* Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there, and no activities connected with them were either organized or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm.
* Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine.
* Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done.

Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party.

The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, ‘Drive the White man into the sea.’ The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the ‘Freedom Charter.’ It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization, of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC’s policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its program.

The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party’s main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction.

It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal – in this case the removal of white supremacy – and is not proof of a complete community of interests.

The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist world.

Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.

I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of communism, fought together with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930s.

This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists could, and did, become members of the ANC, and some served on the National, Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee.

I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since.

It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act.

It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our enemies.

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are.

I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.

It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists.

Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system.

The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world.

I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country’s system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fails to arouse my admiration.

The American Congress, that country’s doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments.

I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East . . .

There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question.

Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources – from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important political case – for example, the Treason Trial – we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources.

But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states.

I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received similar assistance.

On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed.

I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so.

As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of ‘Mr. X,’ the suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enroll the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of the community would join us.

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, ‘so-called hardships.’ Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called ‘agitators’ to teach us about these things.

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per cent are laborers, labor tenants, and squatters on white farms and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30 per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living.

The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr’s department) is R42.84 per month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going.

Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African laborers.

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.

The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on this supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act.

There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African children in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capita Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in the Cape Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent.

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Educational Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953:

“When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge."

The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial color-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by the so-called ‘civilized labor policy’ under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages which far exceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry.

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions – that they fall in love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what ‘house-boy’ or ‘garden-boy’ or laborer can ever hope to do this?

Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men’s hostels. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o’clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labor Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy.

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on color, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one color group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.

This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Nelson Mandela – April 20, 1964

中文版

我已準備好赴死

我是第一被告。

我擁有法律學士學位,並曾在約翰尼斯堡(Johannesburg)和Oliver Tambo合夥執業多年。我曾因沒有取得許可而出境,以及在1961年五月底鼓動人民持續罷工而服刑五年。

首先,我要說明,檢方在開場陳述中指控南非抗爭行動是受到外國人或共產黨所影響的這點事完全錯誤的。我從事的種種行動,不論是基於個人或人民領導者的身份,都是源於我的南非經驗以及我所引以為傲的非洲人(African)背景,不是因為任何外在勢力。

我的青年時光是在川斯凱(Transkei)度過,部落耆老對我說過許多以前的故事,其中包括那些我們的祖先為了保衛家鄉而進行的戰役。Dingane和 Bambata,Hintsa和Makana,Squngthi和Dalasile,以及Moshoeshoe和Sekhukhuni這些人名都代表了整個非洲民族的榮耀。於是我希望在我的生命中能有機會服務我的人民,並盡微薄之力協助他們爭取自由。本案中對我的指控裡所提到我的一切作為,動機就是上面所說的這些。

說到這裡,我馬上得處理有關暴力的問題。到目前為止法院所聽到的事情,有些是事實,另一些則不是。但我並未否認我籌劃破壞行動。我不是因為莽撞也非因為我愛好暴力而進行這些計畫。而是因為對多年來「白人」對我的民族所推行的暴政、剝削和壓迫所導致的政治情勢,經過冷靜而嚴肅的評估後所做的決定。

在此我要立即承認我是協助成立民族之矛(Umkhonto we Sizwe)的組織者之一。而且在1962年八月被補前,在他的行動中我都扮演重要的角色。

在接下來的陳述中,我會對控方證人所創造出的某些錯誤印象提出更正。我還會說明,在證據中所提到的某些行動不是,也不可能是民族之矛所為。我也將解釋非洲民族議會(African National Congress,ANC)和民族之矛之間的關係,以及我在這兩個組織的事務中所扮演的角色。我也會處理共產黨的角色。而為了適當地說明這些事情,我將必須解釋民族之矛成立的目標,他打算採許何種策略達成這些目標,以及為何選擇這些方法。我也將必須解釋為什麼我會參與這些組織的行動。

針對那些起訴(書)指控我們所為、但顯然違背「民族之矛」政策的行動,我否認民族之矛應該負責。我不清楚這些行動發生的原因是什麼,但為了證明他們不可能來自「民族之矛」的授權,我要簡短地說明「民族之矛」的根源和政策。

前面已經說過,我是協助成立民族之矛的組織者之一。我和其他組織發起人成立「民族之矛」的理由有二。首先,我們相信政府政策的結果,將使非洲人民(African People)的暴力行動無可避免,而除非有負責任的領導人出來導引、控制我們人民的情緒,恐怖主義將會爆發,而恐怖主義將造成國內諸多種族間痛苦與敵對的緊張關係,甚而比戰爭所帶來的為劇。再者,我們認為不採用暴力行動,則非洲民族無法在對抗白人優越主義的奮鬥中取得勝利。所有體制內合法表達反對白人優越主義的手段都被法律禁止了。我們處在一個要不就得永久接受次等地位,要不就得反抗政府的境遇中。我們選擇不服從法律(defy the law)。我們首先採取避免使用任何暴力的方式來違反法律,當這種方式被法律所禁止,政府又訴諸武力展示的方式來試圖消滅反對勢力後,我們才決定以暴力來抵抗暴力。

但我們選擇的暴力並非恐怖主義。我們這些成立民族之矛的人都是ANC的成員,都秉持著ANC傳統上藉由非暴力與協商手段來解決政治爭端的信念。我們相信南非屬於住在這裡的所有人,而非某個群體,不論這個群體是黑人或白人。我們不想發起種族戰爭,而且除非到最後時刻,我們都會試著避免讓這種事發生。如果法院對此有所懷疑,我們組織的整個歷史都可以證明我方才所說的以及我接下來說明的,有關民族之矛決定採取的策略。因此,我得談一下有關ANC的事。

非洲民族議會成立於1912年,成立目的是為了捍衛那些被「南非法案」(South Africa Act)剝奪、繼而又受「土著土地法案」(Native Land Act)威脅的非洲人權利。在1949年以前的三十七年裡,它都堅持鎖定在憲政抗爭之上。它提出要求與解決方案;它派代表與政府協商,因為它相信非洲人的處境可以透過和平對話來解決,也相信非洲人將慢慢地取得完整的政治權利。但白人政府卻仍故步自封,非洲人的權利沒有增進,反而卻越來越少。我們的領袖,1952年開始任ANC主席後來並獲得諾貝爾和平獎的Chief(族長?酋長?) Lutuli就曾說:

「誰會否認我三十年來的生命都花在耐心地、溫和地、謙遜地但徒然地敲一扇關著且上了閂的門?溫和的果實是什麼?過去三十年來的結果是眼看著通過大量立法限制我們的權利與進展,一直到今天,我們已經到達一個幾乎甚麼權利也沒有的境界。」

即使如此,1949年後ANC仍然決定避免使用暴力。但在那時,我們一直堅持採用憲法手段來表達反對意見的方式已經有改變。這個改變具體表現在抗議特定種族隔離法案時,我們採取和平但非法的示威行動。基於此一政策,ANC發起了「不服從運動」(Defiance Campaign),在這個運動中我負責領導那些志願者。這個運動乃是立基於消極抵抗的原則。超過8500人因違反種族隔離法案而被捕入獄。但是在這不服從行動的過程中,沒有發生任何一起參與者使用暴力的案例。我和十九個同志因為發起此運動而被判刑,但由於法官認定自始至終整個運動都很自律且非暴力,而停止執行判決。這是ANC志願者部門成立的時刻,此時’Amadelakufa’1)這個語詞首次被使用:志願者被要求承諾堅持特定原則。有關於志願者和他們的誓言在本案中已被提出,但完全都是斷章取義。願者過去不是,現在也不是,誓言發動反白人內戰的黑人軍隊裡的士兵。他們以前是,現在也是,準備好可以投入ANC所發起的運動中擔任領導、散發傳單、組織罷工或執行運動所需行動的工作者。他們被稱為志願者的原因是,他們志願面對牢獄處罰,以及現在已經立法規定的鞭刑。

在「不服從運動」期間,政府通過了「公共安全法案」(Public Safety Act) 和 「刑法修正法案」。這些法案針對以違反法律方式抗議的行為,施以更嚴厲的刑罰。儘管如此,抗議行動仍然持續,ANC仍然堅持其非暴力政策。1956年,包括我在內的156位「議會聯盟」(Congress Alliance)領導成員被補,罪名是「鎮壓共產主義法案」(Suppression of Communism Act)中的叛國罪。當時檢方曾經質疑過ANC的非暴力政策,不過大約五年後法院在判決中認定ANC沒有暴力的主張。所有指控我們的罪名,包括指控ANC 試圖建立共產國家等等,我們都被判無罪。政府總是想將所有異議份子貼上共產主義者的標籤。本案也一樣,但我將會證明ANC從來就不是一個共產組織。

1960年Sharpeville發生槍擊事件,政府宣佈進入緊急狀態,並宣告ANC為非法團體。在仔細的考慮後,我的同志和我決定我們不遵守此命令。非洲人不是政府的一部份,而統治著非洲人的法律也不是他們所制定。我們相信世界人權宣言(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)所說的:「人民的意志是政府權力的基礎」。對我們來說,接受此禁令無異於接受非洲民族將永遠噤聲。ANC拒絕解散而走入地下。我們相信我們有責任保存這個成立五十年來努力不懈的組織。我認為也沒有自重的白人政治組織會因為一個它沒有發言權的政府宣告非法而自行解散。

1960年政府為了建立這個共和國而舉辦公民投票。佔南非人口約七成的非洲人沒有投票權,甚至也沒人徵詢他們關於修憲計畫的意見。對於我們將來在這個倡議中的白人共和國下的處境,我們所有人都了然於胸。我們決定舉辦「全體非洲人會議」(All-In African Conference)以要求召開「國是會議」(National Convention),並且決定如果政府不召開此會議,我們將在這個不被我們接受的共和國誕生前夕發動大規模的示威。許多不同政治主張的非洲人都參與了這次會議。我是這個會議的秘書長,並且其後隨著共和國成立而發起的全國「待在家裡」(stay-at-home)運動,亦由我負責組織。既然非洲人的一切罷工皆為非法,組織罷工的人必須想辦法避免被逮捕。我被選為這個組織者,所以我必須離開我的住家、家庭和事務所,躲藏起來以免被補。根據ANC的政策,「待在家裡」運動是和平的示威行動。為了避免發生暴力,針對組織者與參與者都給予詳細的指示。政府的回應是引進新的、更嚴厲的法律、動員政府武力、派遣 Saracens2),武裝車輛以及士兵進入城鎮中,藉由大規模展示武力來威嚇人民。這顯示政府打算只使用武力來統治國家,而政府的這個決定是民族之矛成立之路的里程碑。

我所說的這些,其中有些部份看起來和這個審判沒什麼關聯。但事實上我相信沒有一件事是無關的,因為我希望這些陳述可以讓法院體會參與民族解放運動的許多不同的個人和組織最終採取的態度。1962年我入獄時,主流意見是要避免任何人命的損失。我現在知道到了1963年這仍然是主流意見。

我得回到1961年6月說起。身為人民的領導者,我們該做什麼?我們要屈服於武力的炫耀以及屈服於對任何未來行動鎮壓的暗示?或者我們應該反抗?又要如何反抗?

對於應該繼續反抗的立場,我們絲毫不懷疑。任何其他選項就是絕望的投降。我們的問題不在該不該反抗,而在如何繼續反抗。ANC一直都主張非以種族為基礎的民主政體,並且拒絕那些甚而會導致比已然種族分裂的現狀更進一步種族分裂的行動。但殘酷的事實是,五十年來非暴力的行動完全沒有為非洲民族帶來什麼進展,取而代之的是越來越多的立法壓迫,以及越來越少的權利。也許對法院來說很難理解,但事實是長久以來人們一直都在談論—某天將攻擊白人而取回我們國家 —這類的暴力行動,而作為ANC領導者的我們,並非總能說服他們避免暴力,繼續堅持和平手段。1961年五、六月間,我們當中的一些人討論到這點的時後,我們沒有辦法否認我們透過非暴力行動來達成「非種族國家」(nonracial State)目標的政策什麼都沒有達成,我們也沒有辦法否認追隨者對非暴力政策開始失去信心,而且已在發展令人不安的恐怖主義。

請不要忘記,事實上到那個時候,暴力已經是南非政治景緻的特徵。1957年Zeerust的女性被要求攜帶通行證時發生過暴力;1959年 Sekhukhuniland被強迫減少牲口時發生過暴力;1959年 Cato Manor人抗議通行證搜捕時發生過暴力;1960年政府試圖在Pondoland強行設立班圖政府(Bantu Authorities)時發生過暴力。在這些動亂中,39個非洲人喪生。1961年時在Warmbaths發生暴動,而川斯凱在那時都一直處在動盪不安的狀態中。每一次騷動都清楚指出,相信暴力是唯一解決方式的非洲人不可避免地增加了:這些事件說明了政府使用武力來維持其統治的行動教導了反對者使用暴力來反抗。在都市地區已經有一些小群體組成,並自發地計畫著暴力形式的政治抗爭。如果沒有適當地導引的話,這些群體將有採用恐怖主義對待非洲人以及白人的危險。特別令人擔憂的是像在Zeerust、Sekhukhuniland和Pondoland這些地方非洲人間發生的暴力形式。這種暴力逐漸演變成人民內部的衝突,而非對政府的抗爭—儘管是由政府所引起,這種方式的行動除了喪失生命與痛苦外,什麼都達不到。

1961年六月初,經過對南非狀況長期且焦慮的評估後,我和某些同志的結論是國內暴力勢不可免,在這個政府使用武力回應我們和平主張的時候,非洲人領導者繼續主張和平與非暴力是不切實際、也是錯誤的。

結論並非簡單就形成。只有在其他的方法都已失敗,所有和平抗議管道都被禁止時,才決定採取暴力形式的政治鬥爭,並成立民族之矛。我們這麼做並非我們想要這麼做,而完全是因為政府讓我們無所選擇。1961年12月16日公佈的民族之矛宣言,也就是證據AD,如此說著:

「屈服或戰鬥,任何民族生命中都會遇到僅剩這兩種選擇的時刻。對南非來說,這個時刻已經到來。我們絕不屈服,因此我們只能選擇用我們所能採用的一切手段反擊,捍衛我們的人民、我們的未來和我們的自由。」

這是在1961年六月,我們決定改變民族解放運動的策略時的感受。我只能說,我覺得道德上我有義務去作那些事情。

我們這些做此決定的人開始徵詢包括ANC在內的幾個組織領導者的意見。我將不會在此說明我們跟誰討論以及討論了什麼,但我希望能解釋有關ANC在這個抗爭階段的角色,以及民族之矛的政策與目的。

就ANC的觀點而言,它的意見很清楚,可以簡述如下:

1.
它是一個有明確政治目標要實踐的群眾政治組織。其成員都認同非暴力政策。
2.
因此,他不能也不會運用暴力。這點必須要強調。沒有人可以把這個群體轉變成執行破壞行動所需的小規模、緊密結合的組織。而且,這樣在政治上也不是正確的,因為這樣導致其成員停止實行其核心行動:政治宣傳與組織。這個組織的整個性質也不允許被改變。
3.
換句話說,在我前面說的情況中,ANC準備悖離其五十年之久的非暴力政策,但其限度是它不再反對經適度控制的暴力。因此參與這種行動的成員將不會遭ANC懲戒。

我說「經適度控制的暴力」,因為我清楚的表明,如果我成立了這個組織,我將一直服從ANC的政治指令,且不會從事任何ANC不可能贊同的其他形式的行動。我現在將對法庭說明如何決定採用那種形式的暴力。

由於此決定,民族之矛在1961年11月成立。當我們做此決定並隨後擬定我們的計畫時,ANC非暴力和族群和諧的傳統總是和我們同在。我們覺得我們的國家正朝著黑人和白人彼此爭戰的內戰傾斜。我們對這樣的情勢很警覺。內戰意味著ANC所支持的一切將會毀滅,一旦發生內戰,種族和平將會比以往更難達成。南非的歷史上已經有好幾個戰爭結果的例子。「南非戰爭」(South African War)的傷痕超過五十年才消失。那麼,將造成雙方損失大量人命的種族內戰傷痕,又要花多少時光才能弭平?

避免內戰一直是我們多年來的想法,但當我們決定在我們政策中納入暴力行動時,我們知道有一天我們將有面對這樣戰爭的可能性。關於這個可能性,在擬定行動計畫時就必須納入考慮。我們需要一個有彈性且允許我們根據時間需要行動的計畫;最重要的,這個計畫必須能認同內戰是最後手段,應該將這個問題留到未來決定。我們並不想發動內戰,但當無可避免時,我們要準備好。

有四種可能的暴力形式。包括破壞行動、游擊戰、恐怖行動和公開革命。我們選擇採取第一種,而且在做其他決定前將竭力於此。

從我們的政治背景來看,採取此種選擇是符合邏輯的。破壞行動不會造成傷亡,並為未來的種族關係提供最好的希望。痛苦可以控制在最低程度,而如果這個政策有效的話,民主政府將可能實現。這是我們那時的感覺,也寫在我們的宣言(證物AD)中:

「我們民族之矛總是希望藉由沒有血腥與國民衝突的方式達到解放的目標。即使在這個最後時刻,我們仍然希望我們的第一次行動將會使每個人都了解國民黨政策所導致的苦難事實。我們希望我們能在一切都還沒有太遲前,讓政府及其支持者了解這種狀況,因而政府能在內戰的絕境發生前改變其政策。」

最初的計畫乃是基於對國家政經狀況仔細的分析後而作成。我們相信南非很大程度依賴外國資本和外國貿易。我們認為有計畫的破壞發電廠、干擾鐵路運輸和電話通訊等會讓外資驚慌而撤資,讓貨物從工業區準時運送至港口的難度增高,長期來看將會大量地消耗國家的經濟命脈,而迫使國家選民重新考慮他們的立場。

對經濟命脈的攻擊將連結到對政府建築和其他種族隔離象徵的破壞行動。這些行動的目的在鼓舞我們的人民。除此之外,這些行動也將提供那些一直要求我們使用暴力的人民發洩情緒的出口,同時也可以讓我們對追隨者,提供我們已經採取更強烈的方式,已經在對政府暴力做出反擊的具體證明。

更甚者,如果成功了組織大規模行動,而且又導致大規模的報復,我們認為將會喚起其他國家對我們目標的同情心,而會對南非政府產生龐大的壓力。

這就是我們當時的計畫。民族之矛將會執行破壞行動,而一開始就嚴格指示每個成員,不論在任何情形下都不能計畫或執行傷害或殺害人民的行動。這些指示請參見’X先生’和 ‘Mr先生’3)的證詞。

民族之矛由一個全國最高指揮組織(National High Command)所控制與領導,它有吸收成員的權力,並可(也確實指派了)指派區域指揮組織。最高指揮組織決定戰術與目標,並且負責訓練和財務。在最高指揮組織之下,區域指揮組織負責領導地方性的破壞行動團體。在最高指揮組織所制定的政策架構下,區域指揮組織有權選擇攻擊目標。他們沒有權力凌駕這個政策架構,因此沒有權力進行會威脅到人命這類不符合破壞性行動原則的行動。舉例來說,民族之矛成員不被允許在行動中攜帶武器。附帶一提,最高指揮組織和區域指揮組織這些名詞是從取自活躍於1944年到1948年間的猶太民族地下運動組織Irgun Zvai Leumi。

民族之矛的第一次行動發生在1961年12月16日,我們對約翰尼斯堡、伊莉莎白港和德本的政府建築發動攻擊。這些目標的選定可以證明我剛剛所說的政策。如果我們意在攻擊人的話,我們會選擇人群聚集的地方,而非空蕩的建築物和發電廠。1961年12月16日以前所發生的任何破壞行動都是別的獨立的群體所為,和民族之矛無關。事實上,其中部份行動和之後的某些行動,別的組織都宣稱是其所為。

民族之矛的宣言是在這些行動發動日宣佈。白人對我們行動和宣言的回應是相當地暴力。政府威脅採取強硬的行動,並要求其支持者堅定不移並忽視非洲人的要求。對我們的行動白人沒有以改變來回應,反而是以裝甲車等武力防禦回應。

相對於此,非洲人的反應則是一種鼓舞。突然之間又有希望了,事情正在發生。城鎮裡的人變得熱衷於政治新聞。剛開始的成功產生了大規模的熱情,人們且開始猜想多快可以獲得自由。

但我們民族之矛的人對白人的反應感到憂慮。界線正在被畫清。白人和黑人正分別投向不同陣營,試圖避免內戰的前景沒有進展。白人報紙報導說破壞行動者將會被處以死刑。如果真的是這樣,我們該如何繼續讓非洲人遠離恐怖主義?

已經有大量的非洲人死於種族衝突。1920年著名的領袖Masabala被關在伊莉莎白港監獄時,24個非洲人因為集會要求釋放Masabala而被警察和白人平民殺害。1921年,超過百名非洲人死於Bulhoek事件。1924年,西南非當局面對反對實施狗口稅的團體時,以武力鎮壓,超過200 個非洲人被殺害。1950年五月1日罷工期間,18個非洲人遭警察射殺。1960年3月21日,69名沒有武裝的非洲人死於Sharpeville。

到底我們的國家歷史上還要在發生多少次的Sharpeville事件?我們的國家又可以承受多少次的Sharpeville事件,而不讓暴力和恐怖變成日常生活的一部份?而一旦到那個地步我們的人民又會怎樣?長遠來說,我們認為我們一定會成功,但在成功前要犧牲多少的自己人和其他人?而且一旦成功之日到達,黑人和白人要如何再次共存於和平與和諧中?這是我們所面對的問題,接下來是我們的決定。

經驗告訴我們反叛將會讓政府有無限的機會無差別地屠殺我們的人民。但正因為南非的土地已經浸染在無辜的非洲人的鮮血中,我們認為,為了抵抗武力攻擊,我們的責任是為長期抗戰做好準備。如果戰爭是無可避免的,我們要讓戰鬥能夠站在有利於我們人民的一邊。對我們來說最好以及最能減低雙方傷亡的戰鬥方式是游擊戰。因此,我們決定,為了將來可能的游擊戰,我們將籌措各種設備與補給。

所有白人都必需接受軍事訓練,但非洲人則沒有這種訓練。在我們的看法中,有必要建立一支有訓練的核心隊伍,他們必須能夠擁有當游擊戰開始時所需的領導能力。我們必須在事情還沒有太遲前為這種狀況做好適當的準備。同時,也有必要建立一支受有行政管理和其他專業訓練的核心隊伍,如此,一旦在非洲人被允許參與政治時,他們將馬上有參與政府運作的能力。

在此階段,我決定我應該參與「中非、西非與南非泛非洲自由運動」(Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa)1962年初在Addis Ababa召開的大會。而由於我們得準備好,我也決定在該次會議後,到幾個非洲國家旅行以便取得訓練士兵所需的裝備,我也要徵募一些能為非洲人提供高等教育的學者。即使改變是以和平手段達成,這兩個領域的訓練也都是必要的。要能夠管理非種族國家,管理者是必要的,同樣的,也要有能夠管理這種國家的軍隊和警察的人。

在筆記中提到我是以ANC代表的身份離開南非到Addis Ababa 。我的旅行很成功。不管到那裡我都遇到對我們狀況表達同情並承諾提供援助的人。所有的非洲都團結起來反對白人的南非,即是在倫敦,我也得到如Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond等政治領導者的同情。在非洲,我得到以下這些人援助的承諾,Julius Nyerere,Tanganyika的現任總統;Mr. Kawawa,後來的Tanganyika首相;Ethiopia 皇帝 Haile Selassie ;蘇丹總統Abboud將軍;突尼西亞總統 Habib Bourguiba;Keita現任總統 Ben Bella;馬利總統Modibo Keita;塞內加爾總統 Leopold Senghor;幾內亞總統Sekou Toure;利比亞的總統 Tubman ;以及烏干達的首相Milton Obote。Ben Bella邀請我拜訪阿爾及利亞民族解放軍總部Oujda,我的日記(證據之一)有關於此次訪問的紀錄。

我開始學習戰爭和革命的藝術,而且在國外時參與了軍事訓練課程。如果將要發生游擊戰,我要能夠和我們人民站在一起共同戰鬥並和他們一起分擔戰鬥的危險。我在阿爾及利亞的課程筆記在證物16號,以作為證據呈現。有關游擊戰書籍和軍事策略的摘要也在其中。我已經承認這些文件都是我寫的,而且我承認我自己做了這些研究以便在萬一鬥爭演變成游擊戰時,為我也許必須扮演的角色做好準備。就像所有非洲民族運動者都該做的,我研究這個問題。我是全然客觀的。法院將會看到我試圖檢視在這個主題上各類型的權威,包括東方與西方,回溯到Clausewitz的古籍,並且同時包括毛澤東、格瓦拉,以及Anglo-Boer 戰爭。當然,這些筆記只是書籍摘要,而不包含我的個人觀點。

我也為我們的新兵安排進行軍事訓練。但如果沒有得到(非洲)ANC成員的協助,是不可能進行這種計畫。因此我取得南非ANC的允許做此事。到這個地步已是偏離了ANC原來的決定,但這只適用於南非以外,第一批的新兵確實抵達Tanganyika是在我正離開Tanganyika返回南非之際。

我回到南非並向我的同志們報告我這次旅行的結果。在我回來時,我發現政治的情況沒有多少變化,對破壞行動施以死刑的威脅並已成真。民族之矛同志們的立場和我離開前大都相同。他們慎重地考量他們的方向,而認為距離破壞行動用盡之日還有很長一段時間。事實上,有些人並且認為現在訓練新兵還太早。我在證物 R.14的文件中有紀錄這事。但在完整的討論後,我們決定繼續進行軍事訓練的計畫,因為要建立一個有效能開始游擊戰的核心隊伍得花上很多年,而不論發生什麼事情,這些訓練都是我們的資產。

現在,我希望轉到一些控方在本案中提出的一般性指控。但在此之前,我希望能還原證人說的幾個發生在伊莉莎白港和東倫敦的事件原貌。我被指控參與在 1962年9月,10月與11月間幾起政府支持者住宅的爆炸事件。我不知道這些行動的理由是什麼,也不知道是被什麼所激怒,但如果我之前說的能被接受的話,這些行動很清楚地和實踐民族之矛的政策無關。

起訴書中的一個主要指控是,ANC是犯下破壞行動的共謀。我已經解釋了為什麼這個指控是錯的,而且外在環境如何對ANC原來制定的原則產生變化。

當然由於在會議室的氛圍中產生的的解決方案和落實在實際行動中的困難間有所差異,ANC內部同時也有改變。(當然,內部也有些許多功能重疊,因為在會議室氛圍內所做的決定,和實際行動所遇到的具體困境是有差異的。)之後,這個立場進一步受到禁令、在家監禁以及一些人離開這個國家在國外繼續從事政治工作所影響。這使得個人必須根據所處不同的地位繼續工作。但縱然這可能會模糊ANC和民族之矛之間的差別,卻無法說兩者的區分不存在。在南非內一直都非常注意區分這兩個組織行動。ANC仍然是非洲人的群眾政治組織,只從事那種在1961年以前就已在進行的政治工作。民族之矛保持其小規模的組織,他從不同的種族和組織招募成員,並且試圖達成其自己的特定目標。民族之矛的成員招募自ANC的事實,以及像Solomon Mbanjwa等同時參與兩個組織的人的事實,從我們的觀點看來並未改變ANC的性質,也未使ANC採取暴力的政策。二者間幹部的重疊是例外而非原則。這是為什麼像X和Z先生這些在他們的區域擔任區域指揮官的人,並未參與任何ANC的委員會或活動,這也是為什麼像Mr. Bennett Mashiyana 和Mr. Reginald Ndubi在ANC聚會中未曾聽聞破壞行動的原因。

起訴書中另一個指控是Rivonia是民族之矛的總部所在。這在我待在Rivonia時並非事實。當然,我曾被告知也知悉共產黨的某些活動是在那裡舉行,但這並非我不應該用那個地方的理由,我待會會說明這點。

我到那裡是基於以下幾個理由:

– 前面已說過,在1961年四月初,我走入地下以組織五月大罷工。我的工作需要走到國家各地,有些時候住在非洲人城鎮,有些時候在村落,也有又回到都市之時。在那年的下半年,我開始拜訪Arthur Goldreich在Parktown的住家,我常私下在那裡和我的家人會面。雖然我和Arthur Goldreich4)從來沒有直接的政治關係,但我從1958年開始就在公開場合認識他。

– 十月間,Arthur Goldreich通知我說他要搬出城,他要把那個地方提供給我躲藏。之後幾天,他安排Michael Harmel 帶我到Rivonia。我很自然地發現Rivonia是反叛者生活的理想地方。在那之前,我一直被迫在白天躲在屋裡,只有在黑夜的掩飾下才可以冒險外出。但在Rivonia的Liliesleaf農場5),我可以有不一樣的生活,而且可以更有效率地工作。

– 基於很明顯的理由,我必須偽裝自己身份,因而我用David作為假名。十二月間Arthur Goldreich和他家人搬進來。一直到1962年1月11日我出國前我都還待在那裡。前面已經說過,我在1962年七月返國並在八月5日在Natal 被捕。在我被補之前,Liliesleaf既非ANC也非民族之矛的總部所在。除了我以外,沒有任何這些組織的幹部或成員住在那裡,甚至沒有任何領導組織的會議在那裡舉行,而且也沒有任何和他們有關的行動在該處組織或指揮。在我待在Liliesleaf期間,我曾經和ANC以及NHC的執行委員開過多次會,但那些會議是在別處召開,而不是在農場裡。

– 待在Liliesleaf農場期間,我常到主屋拜訪Arthur Goldreich,他也會到我房裡。我們之間有過多次涉及各種主題的政治討論。我們一般性地討論意識形態和實踐問題、「議會聯盟」、民族之矛及它的活動等,以及他在Haganah 的軍事組織Palmach從軍的經驗。Haganah是巴勒斯坦猶太民族運動的政治團體。

– 由於我對Goldreich的認識,在我返回南非時,我推薦應該吸收他加入民族之矛。但我不知道這是否成真。

另一個控方的指控是ANC和共產黨具有相同目標。由於我必須假定檢方可能會根據某些證據主張我試圖將馬克斯主義帶入ANC,我希望我可以處理這點並處理我個人政治立場的問題。這個對ANC的指控是錯誤的。這已經在叛國罪(Treason)審判中無法被證實的老套指控,現在又再度提出來。但既然這個指控又再度被提起,我應該要解釋一下,同時要解釋ANC和共產黨,與民族之矛和共產黨的關係。

ANC的意識形態信念現在是,且一直是非洲民族主義。這並不是高喊著「把白人淹到海裡」的那種非洲民族主義。ANC所主張的非洲民族主義是非洲人在他們自己的土地上的自由和實現。ANC曾通過的最重要的政治文件是「自由憲章」。不管從那個角度看,自由憲章都不是社會主義國家的藍圖。他要求土地重分配而非國有化,他主張礦業、銀行業和獨占企業的國有化的理由是大獨占企業是只由一個種族所有,而除非國有化,這種主宰的現象將不會因為政治權力的擴大而改變。當所有的金礦都為歐洲企業所有時,撤銷金礦法中對非洲人的禁令只是一個虛偽的姿態。在這個面向,ANC的主張和現在的國民黨以前的政策是一致的,國民黨許多年一直都有將當時為外國資本所掌控的金礦收歸國有的計畫。根據自由憲章,國有化是建立在私有經濟的基礎上。自由憲章的實現將會為包含中產階級在內所有南非的階級都帶來新的富裕氣象。ANC在任何時期都不曾主張對國家的經濟結構做革命性的改變。就我記憶所及,ANC也不曾控訴資本主義社會。

至於共產黨的主張,如果我理解沒錯的話,他主張建立一個基於馬克斯主義原則的國家。雖然他們也為了「自由憲章」而奮鬥,但這是作為解決白人優越問題的短期解決辦法。他把「自由憲章」視為其計畫的開始,而非目標。

和共產黨不同的是,ANC只以非洲人為成員。他的主要目標過去是現在也是為非洲人贏得團結且完整的政治權利。共產黨的主要目標則是消滅資本家,並以工人政府來取代他們。共產黨致力於強調階級差異,而ANC尋求階級和諧。這是最核心的差別。

有關ANC和共產黨常常密切合作這件事是事實。但合作只是其有共同目標的證明–在這個案例中是消滅白人優越主義,而非有完全相同關注的證明。

世界的歷史充斥著類似的案例。也許最驚人的例子是大不列顛、美國、和蘇聯合作對抗希特勒。除了希特勒外,沒有人敢說這種合作讓邱吉爾或羅斯福變成共產主義者或共產主義者的工具,或英國和美國是在建立一個共產主義世界。

另外一個合作的例子恰巧發生在民族之矛。就在民族之矛組成後,我被某些成員告知共產黨將支持民族之矛,後來也的確如此。後來這種支持也公開化。

我相信共產主義者在對抗殖民國家的自由奮戰中總是扮演積極的角色。因為共產黨的短期目標永遠和自由運動的長期目標相同。因此在如Malaya, Algeria和Indonesia的奮戰中,共產主義者總是扮演重要的角色,只是這些國家沒有一個變成共產主義國家。同樣的情形見於上次大戰中歐洲的地下反抗運動中,共產主義者也扮演重要角色。即使今天共產黨最痛恨的蔣介石將軍,也曾和共產主義者一起對抗統治階級,並讓他在1930年代取得中國的政權。

這種共產主義者和非共產主義者共同合作的模式在南非民族解放運動中也不斷地重複。在共產黨被禁以前,由共產黨和議會聯合發動的運動是在實務上是被接受的。非洲共產黨員可以,也確實有成為ANC的成員,也有些人在國家、省或地方議會服務。其中在全國執行委員會中的包括了前共產黨秘書 Albert Nzula,另一個前共產黨秘書Moses Kotane,和前中央執行委員J. B. Marks。

我在1944年加入ANC。而在我的青年歲月中,我保持著如下的觀點:ANC接受共產主義者的政策,以及在特定議題上ANC和共產黨之間緊密地合作,將會沖淡非洲民族主義的色彩。那時我是ANC青年支部的成員,並且屬於某個提議將共產主義者逐出ANC的群體。這個提議被徹底否決。在那些投票反對此提議的人中包括了某些在非洲政治意見上最保守的人。他們支持原來政策的原因是,ANC並非以一個基於特定政治思想學派的政黨型態組成,而是以非洲人的議會的形貌,其中包含著持各種政治信念的人,但都統一在民族解放的共同目標下。我最後被說服,自那之後並一直贊成此觀點。

對於共產黨存有根深蒂固偏見的南非白人來說,也許很難理解為什麼有經驗的非洲政治人物們會如此輕易地接受共產主義者當他們的朋友。但對我們來說理由很明顯。在這個對抗壓迫的階段,理論上的差異是我們無法承擔的奢侈品。更甚者,幾十年來共產主義者一直是南非境內唯一準備好將非洲人視為人類並平等對待的政治團體;他們準備好跟我們同桌進食、和我們說話、跟我們生活,以及和我們一起工作。他們是唯一準備好和非洲人一起爭取政治權利和在社會佔有一席之地的政治團體。因此,今日有許多非洲人傾向將自由等同於共產主義。由於立法機關將所有倡導民主化政府和非洲人自由的人都烙上共產主義者的印記,並以「鎮壓共產黨法案」禁止他們很多(即使不是共產主義者)活動,更加深了這樣的想法。雖然我從來就不是共產黨員,我個人也曾因參與「不服從運動」而在那個惡劣的法案下被指為共產黨,我也因該法案而被禁止活動並入獄。

並非只有在國內政治上,我們將共產主義者視為支持我們目標的人之一。在國際場域上,共產國家總是援助我們。在聯合國和其他世界組織中,共產集團支持非亞對抗殖民主義,相較於某些西方勢力,他們更常對我們處境表達更多的同情心。雖然大家都反對種族隔離,但共產集團總是比多數白人世界發出更大的聲音表達反對。在這樣的情況下,只有輕率的年輕政治人物,就如同我在1949年時一樣,才會宣稱共產黨是我們的敵人。

我現在要說明我自己的立場。我已經否認我是個共產主義者。而且我想我參與的那些事件明確地說明了我的政治信念為何。

我一直先將我自己視為是非洲愛國者。畢竟我是在46年前生於Umtata。我的監護人是我擔任Tembuland最高首長的表親,而且我和現在paramount最高首長Sabata Dalindyebo和川斯凱的首相Kaizer Matanzima都有親戚關係。

今日我被無階級社會的想法所吸引,部份的吸引來自閱讀馬克斯主義,部份則來自於我對這個國家內早期非洲社會的結構與組織的欽羡。土地,當時主要的生產工具,是歸部落所有。沒有貧富差異也沒有剝削。

我已經說明,我受馬克思主義所影響的確是事實。但對許多新獨立國家的領導者來說這也是事實。像甘地、尼赫魯(Nehru), Nkrumah, and 納瑟(Nasser)等等這些差異很大的人都承認這個事實。我們都接受某種形式的社會主義是必要的,這可以讓我們的人民趕上世界上的先進國家,並且可以改變他們極貧的狀態。但這並不意味著我們就是馬克思主義者。

因此,就我這部份而言,我相信有關共產黨是否在我們政治鬥爭的某個特定階段裡扮演特定角色的問題是可以公開辯論的。在現階段最基礎的工作在於消除種族歧視,並根據自由憲章達成民主的權利。只要共產黨能對此工作有益,我就歡迎他的協助。我了解這是讓各種族的人們都可以參與我們的奮鬥的一個方式。

從我對馬克斯主義文獻的閱讀和與馬克斯主義者的對話中,我得到的印象是共產主義者將西方的議會制度視為不民主與反動。和他們的觀點不同,我是那種體系的支持者。

[英國]大憲章、權利請願書、[美國]權利法案是全世界民主派人士所尊崇的文件。

對於英國的政治制度與法律制度我有很大的敬意,我將英國議會制度視為世界上最民主的機制,而其司法的獨立與公正從來都沒有讓我感到失望。

美國國會、權力分立的原則,以及其司法的獨立也讓我有同樣的感受。

我的思想同時受到西方和東方的影響。所有的一切都讓我覺得我對政治原則的追尋應該要秉持不偏頗的客觀態度。我應該不讓自己只限於社會主義之外的其他特定社會制度。我必須要讓我自己能夠自由地向西方和東方的優點學習。

部份證據懷疑我們從國外得到財務援助,我希望能說明這個問題。一直以來我們的政治奮鬥都受到國內資源的資助,這些資助來自我們自己的人民和支持者。當我們面對特別的運動或重要的政治案件,譬如說叛國罪大審(TreasontTrial)時,我們獲得西方世界同情我們的個人和組織的財務協助。我們從不認為我們必須要擴展更多的資助來源。

不過當民族之矛在1961年成立,引入新型態的鬥爭時,我們確信這些活動將會對我們的稀少資源帶來重大負擔,而且我們行動的規模將會受到資源不足所阻礙。我在1962年1月出國的所得到的指示之一即在從非洲國家募款。

我必須附加說明,當我在國外和其他非洲政治運動領導者討論時,我發現幾乎每一個在還沒能完成獨立區域的人,都接受社會主義國家和西方各種形式的援助,其中包含財務支援。我也發現某些有名的非洲國家,他們都非共產國家,甚至是反共的,也都接受類似的援助。

在我回國後,我強烈建議ANC我們不應該自我受限於非洲和西方國家[的援助],而更應該派代表到共產國家尋求資金以因應我們的急需。在我被判刑後,我被告知確實有派出代表,但我不準備說派到那個國家,我也沒有權利揭露那些給我們或承諾支持我們的組織和國家的名字。

就我對本案的了解,尤其是X先生的證據,指控民族之矛乃受共產黨所鼓動,而共產黨是試圖藉由玩弄虛構的不滿境況來鼓動非洲人加入一支表面上是為了非洲自由而奮鬥,但事實上是在為建立一個共產國家而戰的軍隊。事實不會說謊。事實是這個主張完全是荒謬的。民族之矛是由那些為了促進在自己土地上自由的鬥爭的非洲人所組成。共產黨和其他人支持這個運動,而我們只希望有更多社會的其他人能加入我們。

我們對抗的是真實而非虛構的苦難,或套用檢方的語言來說,「所謂的苦難」。基本上,我們要反抗的是,存在於南非非洲人生活的二個特點,而這些特點是由那些我們試圖要廢止的立法加以強化的,那就是:貧窮和缺乏人性尊嚴。我們不需要共產主義者或所謂的「搧動者」來教我們這些事。

南非是非洲最富裕的國家,也可能是世界上最富裕的國家之一。但它卻是個充滿極端、顯著矛盾的地方。白人享受著也許是世界上最高的生活品質,非洲人活在貧窮和悲慘中。非洲人中,有百分之四十的人住在無望的、過度擁擠的、以及在某些案例中,飽受旱災所苦的保留區中,土壤侵蝕和過度使用使他們無法靠著土地有著合適的生活。百分之三十的人是白人農場的勞工、勞力佃農和開墾者,過著像中世紀農奴般的生活。其他的百分之三十住在城鎮裡,他們有比較發展的經濟和生活型態,而在許多方向讓他們接近於白人的生活標準。但多數的非洲人,即使屬於上述最後一種群體,都因為低收入和高生活開銷而生活在貧窮之中。

在都市非洲人中,收入最高而且最繁榮的部份在約翰尼斯堡。然而,他們的實際狀況令人絕望。最新的數據來自於1964年3月25日,由約翰尼斯堡「非歐洲人事務部」經理Mr. Carr所做的研究。據該部門指出,約翰尼斯堡一般非洲家庭的貧窮線是每個月R42.84。他指出一般非洲家庭的平均月收入只有R32.24,而約翰尼斯堡非洲家庭裡46%的收入根本無法應付生活所需。

貧窮伴隨著營養不良和疾病。非洲人間營養不良和因而導致疾病的發生率非常高。肺結核, 玉蜀黍疹, 惡性營養不良, 胃食道疾病, 和敗血症帶來死亡和對健康的殘害。嬰兒死亡率是世界最高之一。根據Pretoria健康醫學部的調查,每天有四十人死於肺結核(幾乎都是非洲人),而在 1961年共有58,491個新病例發生。這些疾病不只損害身體的重要器官,還導致心智喪失與缺乏自主能力,並減低專注力。這些情況的附帶結果則是影響到整個社群和非洲勞工的工作品質。

但是非洲人的抱怨並非只是針對非洲人貧窮白人富有的情形,還在於白人通過的法律是設計成保持這種狀態。有兩個方式可以對況貧窮,首先是正式的教育,再者是讓工人能取得較高的工作技能而能賺多一點薪資。但就非洲人的處境,這些通往改善的途徑,都被立法者蓄意剝奪。

現在的政府總是想辦法阻撓非洲人接受教育的機會。在他們執政後初期的法案之一是停止非洲人學校的營養經費。許多上學的非洲小孩的飲食都依賴這個經費。這是一個殘酷的法案。

對所有白人小孩來說,不論貧富,他們都接受事實上是免費的義務教育。即使有些非洲孩童也有受到同樣的協助,但非洲孩童並沒有相同的機制。一般來說非洲孩童上學比白人孩童所付的錢更多。根據南非種族關係研究所在1963的期刊中所引用的數據,7到14歲的南非孩童中,約有40%沒有就學。至於那些有上學的人,其教育水準和白人孩童有很大的差距。1960至1961年,政府花在接受國家補助學校中的非洲學生的經費每個人是R12.46。同年花在Cape Province(這是我唯一能取得的數據)的白人小孩上的是R144.57。雖然我沒辦法取得確實的數據,但無疑地,我們可以說,那些花了 R144.57的白人孩童都是來自比只有R12.46經費的非洲小孩更富裕的家庭,

教育的品質也有差異。根據班圖教育期刊,1962年整個南非只有5660個非洲小孩通過中學檢定,同年,只有362人通過大學考試6)。這和1953年班圖教育法的辯論時,現任總理有關班圖教育政策的言論大致相符:

「當我取得土著教育的控制權時,我會進行改革,讓那些土著從小就被教育成相信與歐洲人平等[這件事]跟他們無關……相信平等的人並不適於擔任土著教育的教師。當我的部門掌控土著教育時,將會知道土著適合什麼樣的高等教育,以及他是否有機會在生活中運用他的知識。」

另一個對非洲人經濟改善的主要障礙在膚色條款讓工業裡所有比較好的工作都只保留給白人。更進一步的是,即使在那些開放給非洲人的非技術性、或半技術性的職業裡,獲得工作的非洲人不被允許組成工會,雖然工會被Industrial Conciliation Act所承認。這意味者非洲工人的罷工是非法的,而非洲人也不能像那些收入較好的白人工人一樣享有團體協約權。後續的南非政府對非洲工人的歧視政策還可由所謂的「已開化勞工政策」(civilized labour policy)所證明。根據此政策,政府提供那些沒辦法在業界生存的白人工人庇護性非技術性的政府工作,而他們所得到的薪資遠把在業界的非洲雇員平均所得高。

對這些批評,政府慣常的回應是南非非洲人的經濟狀況已經比其他非洲國家的居民好得多。我不知道這個論述是否為真,並懷疑是否能夠不考慮生活開銷水準指數而進行比較。但即使這是事實,至少非洲人認為這完全是離題的。我們的抱怨並非在比起其他國家的人來我們比較窮,而在比起那些住在我們自己的國家裡的白人來,我們很窮。而立法者阻撓我們對這種不平等現象進行改變。

非洲人缺乏人性尊嚴的經驗直接源於白人優越主義的結果。白人優越主義意味著黑人的次等。為了保障白人優越所制定的法律更加深了此種觀念。南非的僕役工作始終是非洲人在做。當有搬運東西或清理的必要時,白人會四顧尋找非洲人來為他做,不管這個非洲人是不是受雇於他。由於這種態度,白人傾向於把非洲人視為不同的品種。他們不把他們當作自己的家人那樣對待;他們不相信非洲人有情緒:他們也會像白人一樣談戀愛,他們也像白人一樣會想和他們的妻子和小孩在一起,他們想要賺更多錢來適當地支持他們的家庭,扶養小孩、打扮小孩,並送他們上學。而有哪個「家童」或「園丁」或勞工能希望做到這些?

通行法案,這是南非施行在非洲人上最可惡的立法之一,將非洲人隨時都置於警察的監視下。我懷疑在南非是否有任何一個非洲男性沒有和警察爭論過他的通行證。每年有成千上百的非洲人被以違反通行法丟進監牢。更糟糕的事實是,通行法將丈夫和妻子分開並導致家庭生活的崩潰。

貧窮和家庭生活崩潰還有其他副作用。小孩們在街道閒晃,因為他們沒有學校可上,或沒有錢可以上學,或者沒有父母在家照料他們去上學,這是因為他們的雙親(如果還有「雙」親的話)必須要去工作來讓家庭能活下去。這使得道德價值崩潰,這是犯罪的警訊,也可能導致暴力增長,而這暴力不只發生在政治場域,也發生在其他地方。城鎮的生活很危險。沒有一天沒有人被刺傷或襲擊。而且暴力還從城鎮擴展到白人社區。入夜後人們不敢獨自走在街上。無視於這類犯罪現在可能被判處死刑,侵入民宅和搶劫案也繼續增加。死刑無法治癒這個潰爛的傷口。

非洲人要的是有能維持生活的工資。非洲人要的是能夠做他們有能力做的工作,而非那些政府說是適合他們做的工作。非洲人要的是能被允許生活在他們工作地點,而不會因為他們不是出生於該處而被強迫離開。非洲人要的是能被允許在他們的工作地點擁有土地,而非被強迫住在他們永遠無法說是他們擁有的租來的房子裡。非洲人要的是成為一般人的一部份,而不被關在他們的集中營裡。非洲男性要的是和他的妻兒一起生活在他們工作的地方,而非不被迫住在不自然的男性居所中。非洲女性要的是能和她的男人在一起,而不是被丟在保留區裡當永久的寡婦。非洲人要的是能被允許在晚上十一點後外出,而不是像幼兒那樣被關在他們的房裡。非洲人要的是被允許在國內旅行,在他們想要的地方找工作,而不是勞動部叫他們去的地方工作。非洲人要的是共享整個南非,他們要享有安全,並且可以在社會裡佔有一席之地。

除此之外,我們還要求平等的政治權利。因為如果沒有平等的政治權利,我們將處於永久的無行為能力中。我知道對本國的白人來說這點聽來很像革命,因為非洲人將佔選民的多數。這讓白人恐懼民主。

但這種恐懼不應該阻礙可以保證為所有人帶來種族和諧和自由的唯一解決方式。所有人都享有公民權將導致種族主宰這種想法並非事實。基於膚色的政治區別完全是人為的,一旦這種區別消失,一個膚色的人群宰治其他人群的現象也會消失。 ANC已經花了半世紀的光陰反對種族主義,當它勝利時,它也不會改變。

這就是ANC奮鬥的目標。他們的奮鬥是純粹民族的。這是非洲人的奮鬥,是來自他們自己的苦難和經驗。這是為了生存權的奮鬥。我的生命已奉獻給非洲人民的奮鬥。我對抗白人專政,也對抗黑人專政。我擁護民主和自由社會的理想,在這樣的社會中所有的人都可以一起和諧的生活,都有平等的機會。這是我希望能達到而生活在其中的理想社會。而如果需要的話,這也是我準備好為它赴死的理想。

2 responses to “i am prepared to die

  1. It’s cool if you are really prepare to die, I think
    only religion can give ppl such a faith

  2. Today, I went to the beach with my kids. I found a sea shell and gave it to my 4
    year old daughter and said “You can hear the ocean if you put this to your ear." She placed
    the shell to her ear and screamed. There was a hermit crab
    inside and it pinched her ear. She never wants to go back!
    LoL I know this is entirely off topic but I had to tell someone!

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